pointed out two possible explanations for this apparent failure of OSH regulation: the so-called noncompliance and inefficacy theories. The first theory proposes that OSH fails to oblige industrial compliance with the safety standards due to the weakness of the enforcement mechanisms. From this perspective the correction of the ineffectiveness of regulation requires more resources than inspection, preferably by increasing economic sanctions of noncompliance.
The inefficacy theory posits that administrative regulation does not help to increase workplace safety because of its technical approach, which is unable to address the major sources of workplace accidents (eg Mendeloff, 1980) . Thus, traditional OSH regulation focuses on making workplace equipment safer to use, thereby giving emphasis to the establishment of standards for the use of tools and protective mechanisms. However, only a small proportion of accidents are solely attributable to mechanical or physical hazards, while, as Bartel and Thomas (1985) point out, the cause of most accidents is a complex interaction of labor, equipment, and workplace environment. Further, this interaction is chiefly driven by firm and industry-specific factors.
Therefore, if OSH technical standards address only part of the problem, their potential for improving workplace safety is arguably limited to preventing some types of accidents under certain conditions. That is, it may well be the case that safety regulation had no impact on the overall accident rate for one nation, but contributes to reducing certain injury categories in specific industries. Hence, Curington (1986) , using industry-level data from the state of New York, could not find any significant change in the aggregate injury frequency rate, but confirmed significant reductions in the frequency of``struck by machine'' injuries and in the severity of``caught in machine'' injuries in some industries. In the same way, Lanoie (1992b) analyzed the effectiveness of the safety policies adopted by the OSH authority (Commission de la Sante¨et Se¨curite¨du Travail) in Quebec. He found a significant decline in the frequency of all accidents in four out of thirty industries considered.
In this paper we analyze the effect of the OSH intervention in the manufacturing sector. We argue that the firms differ across manufacturing sectors in a number of technological and organizational resources that are crucial for the compliance and effective implementation of the safety standards required in OSH laws. Accordingly, we claim that OSH policy is more likely to succeed in those industries where such key resources and capabilities are widely available.
To that purpose we carry out an empirical study to analyze the effectiveness of the occupational risk prevention legislation in Spanish manufacturing. First, we identify two broad categories of manufacturing industries: traditional and advanced. Then, by means of a variety of negative binomial regression models we check whether the adoption of the new OSH legislation had different effects on occupational injuries in each type of industry. From the analysis of industry-level data throughout the period 1988^2004 we provide evidence that the reform of the OSH legislation in Spain did contribute significantly to the reduction of the number of serious injuries in advanced manufacturing sectors, while such an effect is not observed for traditional manufacturing.
In the remainder of the paper we proceed as follows. In section 2 we summarize the main features of OSH regulation in Spain. In section 3 we discuss the relationship between the compliance of OSH regulation and the nature of the industry. In section 4 we present the model specification and the methodology of estimation. We present the results in section 5, and we conclude with the summary and discussion of our results.
The occupational safety and health regulation in Spain
The OSH regulation currently in force in Spain was shaped by the Framework Directive 89/391/EEC (EEC, 1989a) , which established a number of generic principles concerning the improvement of safety and health of workers at work. The Framework Directive was supplemented by subsequent individual directivesöparticularly, those concerning minimum safety and health requirements for the workplace (89/654/EEC) (EEC, 1989b) ; minimum safety and health requirements for the use of work equipment by workers at work (89/655/EEC) (EEC, 1989c) ; minimum health and safety requirements for the use of workers of personal protective equipment at the workplace (89/656/EEC) (EEC, 1989d) ; minimum health and safety requirements for the manual handling of loads (90/269/EEC) (EEC, 1990a); minimum safety and health requirements for work with display screen equipment (90/270/EEC) (EEC, 1990b); minimum requirements for the provision of health and/or safety signs at work (92/58/EEC) (EEC, 1992) . Basically, the directives defined an OSH regulation model based on the establishment of minimum safety standards and the implementation of enforcement mechanisms, in the same spirit of the regulation existing in other countries (eg the USA, Canada, and Australia).
The OSH principles of the EU directives were transposed into Spanish legislation by the approval of the Occupational Risk Prevention Law in December 1995 (Ley 31/1995 de Prevencio¨n de Riesgos Laborales), (2) and various subsequent royal decrees that were approved in the course of 1996. The implementation of such a regulatory framework meant a dramatic change in the way that Spanish firms managed occupational risk prevention, since it imlied the replacement of an obsolete OSH legislation that had remained unaltered since 1971. Sese¨et al (2002) summarize the main features of the legal framework, and the organizational structure of the Spanish National system of Health and Safety at Work.
The Spanish act required employers to comply with new safety and health standards, which were intended to improve the occupational risk prevention at three levels within the firm: technology and productive processes, human resource management, and OSH organization.
First, from the technological perspective, the new OSH law compels the employer to guarantee the safeness of the equipment and the operation process. Thus, it introduced new requirements on risk assessment (Article 16), on the adoption of protective devices (Article 17), on the implementation of emergency procedures (Article 20), on the control of situations of serious and imminent risk (Article 21), on the obligations of firm's suppliers to ensure the safe use of the machinery, equipments, tools, and other means of production they provide, as well as on the safeness of the products and chemical substances for use at work (Article 41).
Second, regarding the management of human resources, the law introduced an extensive set of requirements on the information and participation of workers on occupational risk prevention activities (Article 18), and OSH training (Article 19). The law also defined the characteristics of the health surveillance process, including the types of health analysis to be taken (Article 22), and established specific risk prevention standards for workers with special needs (Articles 24^27) and temporary workers (Article 28).
Finally, for the first time in Spain the OSH law established that the prevention activity had to be organized as a management system. Before passing the OSH law, prevention was based on technical and bureaucratic norms designed to react against specific occupational risks. There were no legal requirements on the coordination or (2) Bolet|¨n Oficial del Estudo 269 32590^32611.
planning of the preventive activities. The new OSH law founded the new principles of the preventive action (Article 15), based on the encouragement of managerial and organizational standards. Firms are obliged to adopt formalized and visible managerial systems for the organization of OSH activity (Articles 30 and 31). Likewise, the organization of the institutional and industrial representation of workers is also regulated. In particular, the new law impulses the creation of OSH committees, which are formed by workers, firms, and safety experts (Articles 38^39). These committees, alongside the traditional union representatives, have to be fully integrated into the broader OSH system.
3 Workplace safety regulation and the nature of the industry As Robson et al (2001) argue, the impact of safety interventions occur at different levels of a workplace safety system. These include the level of safety management, and various human and technical subsystem levels in the organization. Hence, adequate compliance and effectiveness of safety regulations are largely determined by the combination of technology, knowledge, skill, and organization in the firm.
The degree of technology intensity is the basis for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) classification of manufacturing sectors (Hatzichronoglou, 1997) . According to this criterion, four groups of manufacturing industries are identified: (i) high technology, (ii) medium^high technology, (iii) medium^low technology, and (iv) low technology. Starting from this taxonomy, which is also utilized by the Spanish National Institute of Statistics, in this paper we consider two broad categories of manufacturing sector: traditional and advanced. Advanced manufacturing are those industries where most firms, as a rule, utilize a higher degree of technology than others in their production processes. By contrast, traditional manufacturing industries are typically not research and development (R&D) or knowledge intensive. Further, the production process of traditional manufacturers is more labor intensive and requires a lower proportion of highly skilled jobs, thereby showing a lower technological profile. Table 1 shows the National Classification of Economic Activity (NACE) manufacturing sections included in these two categories. The advanced manufacturing group contains OECD's high-technology and medium^high-technology sectors, whilst traditional manufacturing comprises OECD's medium^low-technology and low-technology sectors. Table 1 also shows data referring to Spanish manufacturing that stress the differences in various key indicators between advanced and traditional sectors.
Both types of industries have a number of characteristics that could largely determine the scope and effectiveness of the implementation of safety regulation on each industry. Thus, we posit that the effectiveness of the OSH regulation will be lower in traditional manufacturing than in advanced manufacturing due to (i) their poorer technology content, (ii) the lower qualification of the workforce, and (iii) the lesser development of managerial organizational practices.
The role of technology and innovation
As mentioned above, there are significant differences in the technology content between traditional and advanced manufacturing industries. As table 1 shows, on average the R&D intensity of Spanish advanced manufacturersömeasured by R&D expenditures divided by value added öis around ten times that of the traditional sectors. Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect that firms in advanced industries will implement earlier and more effectively the latest technical safety standards than firms in traditional industries, where innovation and technical change are less intense. Nevertheless, as Harrisson and Legendre (2003) argue, the introduction of new technologies and the changes in work processes that accompany them have an ambivalent impact on workplace safety. On the one hand, the higher the technical change, the faster introduction of modern and safer equipments, and consequently the lower the work-related risks. On the other hand, the introduction of new technologies commonly implies changes in production processes, the elimination of unproductive work time, and an increase in workloads, which are all risk-increasing factors. Harrison and Legendre (2003) show that technological changes are associated with better safety outcomes only if adequate work organization changes and effective preventive programs are implemented to mitigate the potential negative effects of technology changes on occupational accidents. As we argue below, we would expect that such necessary organizational changes are likely to be more effectively implemented in advanced manufacturing.
The qualification of the workforce
It is obvious that the more skilled the workforce, the more effective is the workers' involvement in safety and health training programs (eg Burke et al, 2006) . As shown in table 1, the proportion of highly qualified workers in advanced sectors is almost double that of the traditional manufacturers. Consequently, it should be expected that the fulfillment of the OSH law requirements on information and training on risk prevention are more effective in advanced than in traditional manufacturing industries. Huerta et al, 2002; Myro and Gandoy, 1999 Notes: (1) measured by the ratio of research and development expenditure to value added in 1997; (2) proportion of firms (b 50 employees) with ISO-9001 or ISO-14001 in 1997; (3) proportion of employees with higher education and university graduates in 1997; NACE National Classification of Economic Activity; na not applicable; nec not elsewhere classified.
Managerial and organizational practices
There are certain managerial and organizational practices that make the compliance with safety regulations more effective in reducing occupational risks. On the one hand, it is a common argument in the safety literature that the joint use of advanced quality management systems, environmental management systems, and occupational risk prevention management techniques generates synergies that help to reduce accident rates (eg Arocena et al, 2008; Beechner and Kock, 1997; Rahimi, 1995) . These synergies emerge because quality, environmental, and occupational risk management are based on the principle of prevention rather than corrective action. Merino-D|¨az de Cerio (2003) provides evidence that the utilization of quality management tools and methods is significantly more spread and intense in the Spanish advanced manufacturing sectors than in the traditional ones. As shown in table 1, the degree of implementation of quality assurance systems and environmental management systems in advanced manufacturing sectors, namely through the adoption of the ISO-9001 and ISO-14001 norms, is well above that registered in traditional industries.
On the other hand, the modern paradigm on the field of work organization aims at creating work systems capable of raising the involvement and motivation of workers with a moderate use of supervision as a control instrument, as well as the design of horizontal organizational structures in which decision-making power is displaced downward. These new work organization systems generally entail the definition of richer and more varied jobs, the use of autonomous work teams, and higher levels of worker participation, all of which result in greater worker empowerment (eg Becker and Huselid, 1998) .
A higher empowerment increases the worker's control on the way he or she designs, organizes, and undertakes his or her tasks. Consequently, workers become more aware of the risks inherent in their activities. Further, the implementation of work organization practices such as improvement groups, work teams, and OSH committees facilitates the assessment and communication of workplace risks to the firm management, and thereby to a proper identification and implementation of safety measures. The available empirical evidence confirms that injuries are negatively related to the delegation of authority, and greater autonomy and involvement of workers (Arocena et al, 2008; Shannon et al, 2001; Zacharatos et al, 2005, amongst others) .
Regarding Spanish manufacturing, the same industries that emerge as making the most effort in technology and quality management are also the most advanced in the adoption of work organization practices, such as team working, improvement groups, job enrichment, and suggestions systems (eg Bayo-Moriones and MerinoD|¨az de Cerio, 2001; Huerta et al, 2002; Larraza et al, 2006) . Hence, we argue that such a deeper organizational development acts as an additional factor fostering the adoption and the effectiveness of OSH standards in advanced manufacturing industries.
Methods

Model specification
We analyze the evolution of occupational injuries throughout the period 1988^2004 in the Spanish manufacturing sector, which includes codes 15 to 37 of NACE. More precisely, data are at the industry level (seventeen industries), covering a period preceding the adoption of the OSH legislation (the`prelaw' period 1988^96) and the period following the law approval (the`postlaw' period 1997^2004).
We specify a regression model to explain the number of injuries in terms of a number of potential causal factors. That is, our independent variables are regarded as the explanatory factors of hazards across industries and time:
( 1 )
The dependent variable, INJUR it , accounts for the number of serious workplace injuries in industry i in year t. We do not consider the total number of accidents, but only those with severe consequences for workers' health. This is a usual approach in the literature to avoid the potential reporting bias that affects minor injuries (eg Boone and van Ours, 2006; Bradbury, 2006) . The count of minor accidents is largely affected by the workers' costs and benefits of reporting the accident and consequently of filing the claim. Hence, when a worker suffers a minor injury he or she can decide whether to report it or not. This reporting may be affected by workers' moral hazard behavior. More specifically, if workers are compensated for the accident, they may file the claim even if the accident is inconsequential (Butler and Worrall, 1991) . This propensity of workers to file claims for minor accidents is known as the overreporting effect. In other words, since workers lose less income if they miss work, they may report more injuries and/or stay off work longer (Shapiro, 2000) . However, in periods and industries with high unemployment or low ex post compensation, workers are more likely not to report minor injuries, in order to avoid salary losses or the reduction of the prospect of continuing employment in the future. Such opportunistic behavior is less liable in the case of serious accidents, since their consequences (eg severe pain, hospitalization, amputation) are less likely to be misreported. Therefore, the number of serious accidents is a more reliable measure than the total number of accidents.
Our objective is to estimate the impact of the introduction of new safety regulation on both advanced and traditional industries, separately. To that effect, we define two variables to identify both types of industry, according to the classification provided in table 1 above. Hence, the variables REGTR and REGAD in equation (1) take the value 1 in the case of traditional and advanced industries, respectively, in the period 1997^2004, and 0 otherwise. As argued above, we would expect a more negative coefficient for REGAD than for REGTR.
Equation (1) includes a number of explanatory variables that are shown to be relevant in the literature. First of all, to account for the influence of the size of the industry we include the variable WORKERS, which is the total population of workers exposed to risk in each industry.
Workplace accident rates are directly related to the economic cycle. That is, economic expansions increase the risk of suffering an accident, while in recessions such risk decreases [see Boone and van Ours (2006) amongst others, and Terre¨s de Ercilla et al (2004) for the Spanish case]. The procyclical nature of industrial accidents is traditionally explained by two factors. First, in periods of growth, firms are usually required to recruit less experienced workers in order to meet the demand expansion, thereby increasing the risk of accident. Second, the increase of production intensifies workloads, either through the exertion of overtime hours or by accelerating the rhythm of work. The increase of the workload causes fatigue and stress, which raise the probability of accidents.
To control the effect of the recruitment of new workers we include the variable UNEMP, defined as the annual unemployment rate in each industry. We expect this to be negatively related to workplace accidents. Likewise, to control the impact of production intensity we include the variable PROD, defined as the annual added value per worker in each industry. We expect this to be positively related to the dependent variable.
The rate of temporary employment is traditionally considered an occupational risk factor in the literature (eg Amuedo-Dorantes, 2002; Guadalupe, 2003; Herranz and Toharia, 2006) . On the one hand, it is argued that temporary workers are frequently younger and less experienced than permanent workers. On the other hand, firms have fewer incentives to invest in their safety formation. Accordingly, those industries with a higher proportion of temporary workers should show higher injury rates. We include the variable TEMP in our model, defined as the percentage of temporary workers in each industry.
There is a good deal of evidence showing that small enterprises have higher accident rates compared with larger enterprises (Eurostat, 2007) . Likewise, earlier studies have identified a number of factors explaining the lower quality of OSH management systems in small firms, and their consequent poorer safety performance compared with that in larger enterprises [see Baldock et al (2006) ; Champoux and Brun (2003) ; SÖrensen et al (2007) for updated reviews]. First, complying with OSH regulation is costly, and small firms have fewer resources to invest in risk preventive action. Second, the workforce in small firms is generally younger, less educated, and less experienced than in larger enterprises. Third, small firms are more likely to adopt nonformalized employment relations (Marlow, 2003) . If so, the relatively weak bargaining power of workers will reduce the willingness of the firm to invest in their protection. Finally, it is typical that small firms face a lower frequency of inspection. For example, Bartel and Thomas (1985) found that in the US the probability of inspection of a firm with 500 employees is around five times that of a small firm of ten employees. Hence, small firms may face fairly lower expected penalties from noncompliance.
To account for the effect of firm size we include the variable SIZE, defined as the average number of workers by firm in each industry. In the light of the above, we would expect an inverse relationship between this variable and occupational injuries.
Differences in capital intensity is another factor that may affect workplace productivity and general working conditions. Thus, variations in capital investment are associated with changes in technology and the transformation of working conditions, and thereby with the alteration of the nature of workplace health and safety problems. As argued above, it is difficult to anticipate the overall effect of such changes on safety performance. To control the effect of the rate of capital replacement and variation in capital intensity, we include in our model the variable KINV, defined as the annual net capital investment per workeröthat is, KINV comprises acquisitions of nonfinancial assets less nonfinancial asset disposals divided by the number of workers.
In addition to regulatory reforms, a number of environmental changes may occur over time that affect the level of occupational risköfor example, changes in the educational level of the population, the extension of information and communication technologies, the adoption of public health policies (eg a ban on smoking at work), or the transformation of social habits. It is necessary to control for such changes in any before or after analysis, otherwise the estimation of the effect of OSH reforms on safety performance could be distorted. To account for such effects a usual approach consists of defining a similar control group to correct the regression to the mean estimates. However, such an approach is not reasonable to implement with aggregate sectoral data. The problem is that the potential candidates to be considered as a control group (such as service and agricultural sectors) present substantial differences in accident occurrence in relation to the manufacturing industries. Hence, we have opted to include a time trend variable, YEAR, defined as the series of successive integer values starting in 1988 to account for variations in environmental factors. A negative or positive and significant coefficient associated with this variable would indicate a progressive improvement or deterioration, respectively, of structural occupational safety.
In addition, the use of panel data permits controlling for changes in individual and unobservable heterogeneity of each industry. Basically, unobserved influences on occupational accidents could include idiosyncratic variations in technology, management, or workforce. If unobserved industry-specific effects exists, the residuals for a given industry will deviate from the`average industry' generating serial correlation, which is a common finding in estimations with panel data (Hausman et al, 1984 ). In our model, the unobserved heterogeneity specific to each industry is captured by the variable m i . There are two methods to accommodate the unobserved heterogeneity: random and fixed effects. In the next section we discuss the assumptions and consequences of both methods. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of all variables included in this study as well as their statistical data sources.
Econometric estimation technique
We estimate the relationship between accidents and risk factors modeled in equation (1) by means of a negative binomial regression model, which is a suitable approach for the analysis of data that have counts as possible outcomes. An even count refers to the number of times an event occurs, such as the number of goals scored by a striker in a season, or the annual number of accidents during a given time period. An event count is, therefore, the realization of a nonnegative integer-valued random variable. For this reason, both Poisson and negative binomial regression models have been applied to the analysis of occupational injuries (Fenn and Ashby, 2004; Filer and Golbe, 2003) .
The application of the classic linear regression models to count data yield inconsistent estimates because the dependent variable is not a continuous asymptotically normally distributed variable. To overcome this limitation, Nelder and Wedderburn (1972) Note. All the variables are at the industry level and on a yearly basis.
developed the generalized linear models (GLMs), which have two main advantages. First, they allow room for the dependent variable to follow any exponential distribution such as the Poisson distribution or the normal distribution. Second, they establish a more flexible relationship between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables through the introduction of the link function. In the classical linear model, the estimated mean m i E( y i ) x i b is a linear combination of the explanatory variables. By contrast, the GLMs relax this assumption, permitting different types of relationship in the form m i h(x i b i ) where h(Á) is the link function. Count data variables have traditionally been estimated using the Poisson regression, a technique that belongs to the GLM family. The density function of the Poisson regression can be written as follows:
where y i is the number of accidents for the ith case, y i 3 is the factorial of y i , and y i is its conditional mean and variance.
The main drawback of the Poisson regression model is that the variance equals the mean of the dependent variableöthat is,
In the absence of overdispersion, Poisson regression is the appropriate choice. However, overdispersionöthat is, the variance of the dependent variable exceeds the meanöis fairly common in count data due to the presence of nonobservable heterogeneity (Cameron and Trivedi, 1999) . If overdispersion exists, Poisson regression may result in biased and inefficient coefficient estimates. In that case the negative binomial regression can be used as an alternative to the Poisson distribution. The best known negative binomial model allows the data (ie the number of accidents) to follow a Poisson distribution, but assumed that a degree of nonobservable heterogeneity exists, which is distributed according to a gamma function. Thus, the model in some way assumes that the real mean is not perfectly observable and the nonobservable heterogeneity is therefore assumed to follow a given distribution. The density of the negative binomial model is:
where a is the dispersion parameter which has a nonnegative value, and G(Á) denotes the gamma function. When applying the negative binomial regression model, the expected accident frequency is assumed to be a log linear function of the explanatory variables referred to above in equation (1). The negative binomial model for panel data was introduced by Hausman et al (1984) . In panel data models the unobserved industry-specific heterogeneity can be alternatively defined as fixed or random.`Fixed effect' implies that individual heterogeneity is constant over time and therefore can be captured by a separate parameter for each industry.`Random effect' implies that the individual heterogeneity may be a response to time-varying stochastic processes operating within the unit. The choice between these two assumptions is not obvious. On the one hand, unobserved heterogeneity in the estimation of occupational accidents includes idiosyncratic variations in technology, management, or workforce. To control for these structural variations, a random effects model seems to be more adequate, since there is no reason to think that they hold constant over the period. On the other hand, it is well known that, if the random effects are correlated with the rest of the covariates, the estimation results are inconsistent.
The usual method of choosing between fixed and random effects is by running a Hausman test. Fixed effects models yields consistent coefficients. However, in some cases random effects may be preferable as they could be more efficient estimators, particularly in cases where the industry effects are not constant over time. The Hausman test tests the null hypothesis of consistency of the random effects, comparing the fixed and random models. In our analysis the null hypothesis of consistency of the random effect is rejected, as the p-value of the Hausman test is significant ( p`0X05). Accordingly, we use the fixed effects model to estimate equation (1).
Results
We estimate three different specifications of equation (1). Model 1 includes all the variables discussed above. In model 2 the interactive effects between regulation and the significant explanatory variable are tested. Finally, in model 3 the effects of the explanatory variables on the advanced industries are analyzed by means of the fixed coefficients effect proposed by Hsiao (2003) . To avoid any potential bias associated with colinearity problems with variables related to the economic cycle, such as PROD, we remove (in model 2 and model 3) the procyclical variables UNEMP and TEMP that are not significant in model 1. Table 3 shows the estimates for the three alternative specifications.
As a first comment, note that the high significance of the dispersion parameter a in all model specifications confirms the suitability of using the negative binomial regression over the Poisson regression alternative. The high values of the w 2 and log likelihood also guarantee a reasonable general fit of the three models.
Regarding the effect of OSH regulation, in all model specifications the introduction of the new regulation is negatively correlated with the number of accidents in the advanced industries, REGAD, while it does not have any statistically significant effect on the safety performance of the traditional industries, REGTR. This result is very robust across models and confirms our hypothesis that the adoption of the OSH regulation was more effective in advanced industries than in traditional manufacturing. We can approximate the absolute magnitude of the regulatory impact by estimating the proportional change in serious accidents caused by the enforcement of the new law. This is given by the marginal effects of the REGAD variable.
Let E( yjx, x 0 ) be the expected count for the variable x at the mean (ie x 0 " x), and let E( yjx, x 0 ) be the expected count after increasing x 0 by units, in our case 1. Since the negative binomial is a nonlinear model, the estimates of the coefficient do not represent the linear association between the dependent and independent variables. As a particular version of the Poisson regression, this association is represented by equation (3). Consequently, the percentage change in the expected count can be computed, holding other variables constant, as
We use the parameters of model 1 to calculate equation (5), where b 0 À0X154 is the value of the regulatory coefficient of REGAD in model 1, and 1 is the unit of change in the regulatory variable when the OSH regulation is introduced. This produces a decrease of the expected number of accidents in advanced industries by 14.2%. (3) That is, after the introduction of the new OSH legislation a total of 21168 serious accidents were observed in the advanced industries. According to our estimates it would have been 24 173 occupational accidents in absence of such regulation. In other words, 3005 serious accidents would have been avoided due to the implementation of the new OSH regulation.
The behavior of the rest of the covariates is as follows. As expected, the relation between the work intensity, PROD, and the number of accidents is positive and highly significant. Likewise, the coefficient of firm size, SIZE, is, as expected, negative and highly significant. Smaller enterprises appear to be significantly riskier.
However, the estimated coefficients of UNEMP and TEMP are not significant. This result is consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Amuedo-Dorantes (2002) and Herranz and Toharia (2006) , who argue that the most important determinant of the accident likelihood is working conditions, rather than the short-tenure contracts of temporary workers. Further, both variables appear to be highly correlated with the production intensity, PROD.
The positive sign of the coefficient of KINV suggests that the increase of capital investment has had an overall negative impact on safety in the manufacturing sectors. By contrast, the negative and significant sign of the coefficient associated with the variable YEAR reveals that environmental changes helped to improve safety conditions in Spanish manufacturing.
In model 2 we test the interaction of the regulatory enforcement with the significant explanatory variables of model 1. To that effect we define a multiplicative variable between regulation and the explanatory variables, in the form (REGTR REGAD) Â EXPLANATORY. Results show that regulation is more effective on industries where firms are larger ( b SIZE&REG À0X564). As Bartel and Thomas (1985) argue, this is largely due to the fact that the enforcement of regulation is tighter in large firms because they face a higher risk of inspection.
However, our results show no complementarities between regulation and the production levels and capital investment. Thus, the nonsignificant coefficients of the interactive variables PROD&REG and KINV&REG reveal that economic booms are equally risky in terms of occupational safety in the preregulation and postregulation periods. From a policy-making perspective, this is a worrying result as it suggests that the law fails to control the negative effects of economic cycles on injuries.
Finally, to complement these results we test whether the coefficients of the significant explanatory variables vary between advanced and traditional manufacturing industries. In previous models the effect of the covariates is assumed to be identical in all industries. Instead, we now estimate an alternative model specification, where coefficients vary over cross-sectional units (Hsiao, 2003, page 141) , in the form:
where b k are the common mean coefficients of the k explanatory variables and d k i are the average cross industry variations from the common mean for the case of advanced industries.
The interpretation of coefficients listed in model 3 is slightly different to the one of previous models. For the traditional industries the effect of each explanatory variable is given by the coefficient of the direct effect ( b k ), whereas for advanced industries it is the sum of the direct effect (b k ) and the advanced industry effect (d k i ), coefficient associated with the variables denoted as EXPLANATORY&ADV.
As a first comment, under this alternative model specification the results confirm again the differential impact of the OSH regulation on manufacturing industries, which reinforces the robustness of our previous results. That is, after controlling for crossindustry variations, the change in OSH regulation appears to be significantly effective only for advanced manufacturing industries.
Model 3 also provides some interesting insights regarding the advanced industry effects. Thus, while we do not find significant differences on the effect of production intensity, PROD, on safety outcomes between traditional and advanced sectors, the d coefficients of SIZE and KINV reveal a differential impact of these variables in the safety performance of advanced manufacturing. First, our results indicate that larger firms are safer in advanced than in traditional manufacturing sectors. Second, capital investment has disparate effects in both types of industry. Thus, while capital investment appears to have a negative effect on occupational injuries in traditional industries, it reveals a positive effect on reducing accidents. Note that the magnitude of the coefficient (À0X049) offsets that associated with traditional industries (0.028). This result is consistent with the view that capital investment needs to be accompanied by adequate organizational and managerial practices that mitigate the adverse effects that changes in technology and productive process may have on occupational accidents. And, as argued in this paper, such practices are far more extended among advanced manufacturers.
Conclusions and policy implications
In this paper we find evidence that the approval of the occupational risk prevention law in Spain had different effects in two general types of manufacturing sectors. Particularly, while the change in safety regulation played a significant role in reducing the number of serious injuries in advanced manufacturing sectors, the same did not occur in traditional industries. In this sense, our results stress the importance of the sectoral effects in complying with safety standards, and, consequently, in explaining the success of OSH legislation. , ,
Additionally, our results point out the importance of firm size on determining the occupational risk in manufacturing industries. Thus, we have found not only the wellestablished negative relationship between accidents and firm size, but also the superior capacity of larger firms to implement the OSH law more effectively in increasing safety at work.
We argue that the existence of disparities in the stock of technological and managerial capabilities between these two categories of industry is at the core of the different degrees of effectiveness of the law. In other words, compliance with OSH regulation leads to safety improvements when adequate capabilities (eg innovation, skills, organization) exist. Arguably, the positive effect of OSH legislation in advanced manufacturers might be further reinforced by the existence of potential synergies between technological and organizational dimensions at the firm level. However, the analysis of the existence and importance of such complementarities is out of the scope of this paper, and would justify further research.
It could be argued that the inefficacy of OSH legislation in traditional manufacturing might be due to a weaker inspection of these industries. However, we do not find any reason to think that the intensity of inspection is more lax in traditional manufacturing. Moreover, as Baldock et al (2006) note, inspections are not conducted randomly, but rather through a risk-based approach whereby higher risk establishments are accorded a higher priority for inspection. Accordingly, given that traditional sectors exhibit the highest accident rate we would rather expect a higher inspecting effort in traditional sectors than in advanced ones.
As a general policy implication, the evidence presented here highlights the need of undertaking instrument policies aimed at facilitating the effective fulfillment of the OSH regulation in traditional manufacturing sectors, where firms arguably have more difficulties for compliance with safety standards. In Spain, where traditional manufacturing accounts for 72% of total value added and 76.5% of industrial employment, such intervention should be of particular interest.
